The last sentences of the book are: "The present crisis in Europe is the continuation of the fight for abetter society. That is the ideal of democracy. This ideal is something so high, so valuable, and so dignified that it is worth believing and living. It is worth being a democrat."
There is an assurance in the book, a sanity and magnanimity and courage that make ita tomc.
Dr BeneS sees democracy as "a benefit always in danger and always to be defended, cultivated, guarded and improved." "The Declaration oj Human Rights of the French and American revolutions was a political and philosophical act, in which the intellectual and political efforts of five centuries (or even, one could say, the struggle for the political development and organisation of society in all ages) was concentrated. It was the trIUmph of reason and the freedom of conscience, science and research, the triumph of rationalism as a philosophical method and system against the old mediaeval scho,-lastic philosophy, Catholic theology and religious intolerance."
But this nineteenth-century democracy had not done its full work. It had not solved the social question. "The question of how to transform the political liberal democracy into a new kind of The last sentences of the book are: "The present crisis in Europe is the continuation of the fight for abetter society. That is the ideal of democracy. This ideal is something so high, so valuable, and so dignified that it is worth believing and living. It is worth being a democrat."
But this nineteenth-century democracy had not done its full work. It had not solved the social question. "The question of how to transform the political liberal democracy into a new kind of social and economic democracy arose." "The bourgeois postwar European society is just now waging a new life-and-death struggle of enormous dimensions. It is a struggle both for· the preservation of political democracy against the right-wing totalitarian dictatorships on the one side, and for the solution of social problems in the spirit and in the framework of political democratic institutions against the communist system on the other. It is a struggle for the transformation of the old, purely political bourgeois democracy into a new, higher and at the same time deeper and more perfect democracy which I will call humanitarian democracy . . . a new phase of democratic experience . . . . " This is in Dr Benes' eyes a gigantic task, bound to take a long time-bound to have its ups and downs, its victories and defeats. The war was a great victory. "The victory of the Allied and Associated nations was not only a military victory; it was, first of all, a spiritual and moral victory of free nations in one of the greatest historical fights for the new free modern man, for· the free modern nation and for the free modern state." "The League of Nations is a symptom and expression of the democratisation of Europe and the world after the Great War and therefore the present League of Nations can exist and function morally only in a demo-' era tic world."
That briefly is Dr Benes' assurance of faith. He does well to remind us of what we are now apt to forget, the nature of the issue involved in the Great War and the elCtent of the democratic victory it implied.
What then has brought us down? The answer to this question is the most interesting part of the book. Dr Benes reviews the events of post-war years, quorum pars magna fuil, and gives his diagnosis of what went wrong.
In the first place the new democracies of Central Europe retained in many ways a social structure made for non-democratic governments, which could be adapted only most imperfectly for democratic purposes. They were therefore ineffective governments. Some of them had what may be called the latest democratic "gadgets" but lacked the real basic necessi6es of democracy. I remember in about 1924 hearing Professor Zimmern read a paper about these new democracies in which he deplored the fact that they had not realized the necessity for: a strong executive. We have aU far too much thought of democracy as having a stock 254 THE UNIVERSITY.OF TORONTO QUARTERLY social and economic democracy arose." "The bourgeois postwar European society is just now waging a new life-and-death struggle of enormous dimensions. It is a struggle both for· the preservation of political democracy against the right-wing totalitarian dictatorships on the one side, and for the solution of social problems in the spirit and in the framework of political democratic institutions against the communist system on the other. It is a struggle for the transformation of the old, purely political bourgeois democracy into a new, higher and at the same time deeper and more perfect democracy which I will call humanitarian democracy . . . a new phase of democratic experience . . . . " This is in Dr Benes' eyes a gigantic task, bound to take a long time-bound to have its ups and downs, its victories and defeats. The war was a great victory. "The victory of the Allied and Associated nations was not only a military victory; it was, first of all, a spiritual and moral victory of free nations in one of the greatest historical fights for the new free modern man, for· the free modern nation and for the free modern state." "The League of Nations is a symptom and expression of the democratisation of Europe and the world after the Great War and therefore the present League of Nations can exist and function morally only in a demo-' era tic world."
In the first place the new democracies of Central Europe retained in many ways a social structure made for non-democratic governments, which could be adapted only most imperfectly for democratic purposes. They were therefore ineffective governments. Some of them had what may be called the latest democratic "gadgets" but lacked the real basic necessi6es of democracy. I remember in about 1924 hearing Professor Zimmern read a paper about these new democracies in which he deplored the fact that they had not realized the necessity for: a strong executive. We have aU far too much thought of democracy as having a stock pattern or perhaps a few stock patterns-not nearly enough thought of it as a principle to be adapted in all sorts of ways to varying conditions. I have been reading lately a most interesting account of the form of democracy being worked out by the Chinese in Shansi. Sun Yat Sen's stock pattern seems fortunately to be for the time in store, and the Chinese are making a pattern of democracy to suit their particular needs with most interesting results.
The second thing that went wrong was the result of Communism. Communism was the revenge of the neglected social question in democracy. Because democracy had stopped short, had on the whole refused to extend its principles to the economic sphere, that neglected aspect received in Communism a tremendous emphasis. It treated democracy as democracy had treated it, and became anti-democratic: while at the same time the fear ot Communism made the well-to-do classes favour Fascism. These classes attacked democracy because they were afraid it would go on to deal with the social quescion: ·Corrununists attacked it because they were sure it would do nothing of the kind. These sworn enemies to each other both attacked democracy.
There is no doubt that Dr Benes is right. This did happen. The German democracy suffered about equally from the rich men who financed Hitler because they were afraid of republican Germany's social legislation, and from the attack of Moscow. The democratic movemen t all over the world is still in this danger. There are still Liberals who say that democrats can have nothing to do with socialism or even perhaps with New Deals, and by doing so they provoke the Communist reply that socialism can have nothing to do with democracy. The progressive forces in all democratic countries have to fight on two fronts. I think this has had a great deal to do wi th the paralysis of the Labour party in this country. Because of the presence. of Communists on its left it has been tempted to go in for vague proposals of far-reaching revolution which it has no desire to carry out. It can't take the sensible course of attacking obvious and crying soci al evil s along with all other people who are ready to attack them. Then it would be accu sed of allying itself· with "capitalist parties." It therefore gets so much concerned with political orthodoxy, with denouncing right-hand defections and left-hand extremes, that it does nothing. The keen young men, disillusioned, go over into Communism, and so the vicious circle is complete. DEMOCRACY TODAY 255 pattern or perhaps a few stock patterns-not nearly enough thought of it as a principle to be adapted in all sorts of ways to varying conditions. I have been reading lately a most interesting account of the form of democracy being worked out by the Chinese in Shansi. Sun Yat Sen's stock pattern seems fortunately to be for the time in store, and the Chinese are making a pattern of democracy to suit their particular needs with most interesting results.
There is no doubt that Dr Benes is right. This did happen. The German democracy suffered about equally from the rich men who financed Hitler because they were afraid of republican Germany's social legislation, and from the attack of Moscow. The democratic movemen t all over the world is still in this danger. There are still Liberals who say that democrats can have nothing to do with socialism or even perhaps with New Deals, and by doing so they provoke the Communist reply that socialism can have nothing to do with democracy. The progressive forces in all democratic countries have to fight on two fronts. I think this has had a great deal to do wi th the paralysis of the Labour party in this country. Because of the presence. of Communists on its left it has been tempted to go in for vague proposals of far-reaching revolution which it has no desire to carry out. It can't take the sensible course of attacking obvious and crying soci al evil s along with all other people who are ready to attack them. Then it would be accu sed of allying itself· with "capitalist parties." It therefore gets so much concerned with political orthodoxy, with denouncing right-hand defections and left-hand extremes, that it does nothing. The keen young men, disillusioned, go over into Communism, and so the vicious circle is complete.
If democracy is to survive, those who believe in it must prove
that it is an infinitely preferable alternative to either Fascism or Communism. That they ought easily to be able to do. But they will never do it unless they give up the old-fashioned laissez-faire theory of democracy: abando n the now completely outworn opposit io n between individualism and socialism: recognize that a planned democracy, that experiments like the New Deal, are not uneasy com promises between democracy and its opposite, but the logical working out of democratic theory. Th e sad fact is that we haven't really got a proper philosophic theory of twentieth-century democracy . It is one of the merits of Dr Benes' book that it maintains that democracy is implied in the very principles of progressive government, and is based on principles so fundam ental that they can be applied to the most varying circumstances. Dr Benes does not give us a programme for soci al democracy. That is Dot his busi ness in ,his book. Bu , his account of 'he decline of democracy in Central Europe makes ,he reader see how vi,ally important i, is th at we should presen t democracy, not as something the older amon g us are accustomed to and don't want to lose, but as a living and progressive fait h which has done much in the past but has far more to do in the future.
For a very long ti me democratic theorists ignored economic questions altogether. Even Lord Bryce in his last great book about the democraci es of the world said that democracy was not concerned with econom ic equality. Such onesidedness always has its revenge. The popular doctrine nowadays is that economics is every thing and poli t ics nothing. Because the older democrats said that if power were distributed equally, it didn', matter what happened to wealth, many "advanced thinkers" say nowadays that if wealth is distributed equally, it doesn' t matter what happen s to power. Even as able a man as Professor Laski, who ought to know better, talks in thi s sort of way. The Webbs in their book on Russia spend so much effort in explaining that political liberty without economic liberty is of no value, that they hardl y consider whether economic 1iberty could exist or be of any v alue without political liberty. So long as men think as loosely as that, they will not seriously defend or fight for democracy. You cannot fight fo r democracy if you will not take seriously problems of power.
If we thin k politics-the problem of the distribution of powerunimportant, and economics everything, we shall have a grim
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If we thin k politics-the problem of the distribution of powerunimportant, and economics everything, we shall have a grim disillusionment, but in the meantime we may have let democracy go. Let us all therefore be clear where we and others stand. Are those on the right prepared to defend democracy even though it involves far-reaching social and economic change? Are those on the left prepared to defend democracy even though it means that the social and economic changes they desire may not come so rapidly as they would if democracy were abandoned? We must be democrats first and individualists and socialists second: I see no reason to suppose that the surviving democracies are safe from the danger of the fatally false disjunction between Fascism and Communism. The testing time will come after the war is over. Unless we have a vision of a planned and inspired democracy as an ideal in the support of which democrats can unite, we may easily find ourselves divided between men who are so frightened of Communism that they become Fascists and men who are so frightened of Fascism that they become Communists, and no democrats will be left. The next count in Dr Benes' diagnosis is "the mistakes and deficiencies in the foreign policy of the great democratic Western European states after the war." He refers in this connection particularly to the spread of pacifism.
The democracies, according to their principles, proclaimed pacifism and opposition to war. . . . Even then when the democmcies (France for instance) had some doubts about the possibility of disarmament, they felt morally obliged to pursue this pacifist policy, have defended these doctrines publicly, educated public opinion in this spirit, and created thus in the democratic countries a quite specia.! pacifistic atmosphere . . . . They frequently lulled their political circles into inactivity and an exaggerated belief or hope that there could be and must be no war. They weakened public opinion for any more resolute resistance and even inculcated a general distaste for the idea that the democratic regimes should ever take up arms for any idea or interest. This state of mind became so general-particularly among certain leaders and cenain classes of the Wes tern democratic powers--tha ( the authoritarian go~ern menls and le~ders considered and even proclaimed democracy as the expression of cowardice, dedaring that it would and must yield in every case where the authoritarian regimes would have the courage to threaten them with war and show the spirit of decision to carry this threat into action. , ..
Thus when the tension between democracy and totali tarianism had reached its highest degree and threatened to explode, the totaH tarian regimes appeared the stronger, with better military preparations and a more effective policy. I myself am con vinced that they only appeared stronger. But it was sufficient that in a number of EUropean conflicts the democracies remained at a disadvllnto.ge and that they were at last systematically found to retreat, to concede, to capitulate.
There is a note: "Manchuria and China) Abyssinia, the occupa- DEMOCRACY TODAY 257 disillusionment, but in the meantime we may have let democracy go. Let us all therefore be clear where we and others stand. Are those on the right prepared to defend democracy even though it involves far-reaching social and economic change? Are those on the left prepared to defend democracy even though it means that the social and economic changes they desire may not come so rapidly as they would if democracy were abandoned? We must be democrats first and individualists and socialists second: I see no reason to suppose that the surviving democracies are safe from the danger of the fatally false disjunction between Fascism and Communism. The testing time will come after the war is over. Unless we have a vision of a planned and inspired democracy as an ideal in the support of which democrats can unite, we may easily find ourselves divided between men who are so frightened of Communism that they become Fascists and men who are so frightened of Fascism that they become Communists, and no democrats will be left. The next count in Dr Benes' diagnosis is "the mistakes and deficiencies in the foreign policy of the great democratic Western European states after the war." He refers in this connection particularly to the spread of pacifism.
There is a note: "Manchuria and China) Abyssinia, the occupa-tioD of Austria, the civil war in Spain, the German-Czechoslovak conflict in September and October 1938, etc." That is all this restrained man has to say to the Western democracies which betrayed his country. Their well-intentioned pacifism was the cause of their weakness and indecision.
This charge which Professor BeneS makes is worth serious consideration. No' one can look back on all those years since the war and deny the indecisiveness and weakness of the foreign policies of the great Western democracies. No one can deny either, I think, that part, of their indecisiveness came from the fact that there was a strong "peace at any price" party In all those countries. This indecisiveness is not a necessary characteristic of democratic foreign policy. Britain did not behave Ii ke that before the war. The United States in 1914 never "dithered'~ as it does now. How has this change come about?
I think the answer is twofold. The great Western democracies in 1914-18 made an enormous and prolonged effort of will. They did really fight for a great world ideal. In that fight they won. They were then bound to be disillusioned. This has nothing to do with whether war does or does not settle things. All great and prolonged efforts of will are followed by disillusion. For in order to sustain ourselves in a long struggle we, almost inevitably, paint apocalyptic pictures of what is to come at the end of the struggle. For example, the Labour party in England at the present time is suffering because after a long and heroic struggle against aU manner of odds it at last attained power. Its followers had upheld themselves through all those years by painting pictures of the changed world which a Labour victory would bring about-by making promises which in the nature of the case could not be redeemed. The Labour party at last achieved power and the miracle did not happen. Disillusion supervened. It was not that nothing was achieved by Labour. A great deal was achieved, but not a new heaven and a new earth. The same fate befell to some extent the women's suffrage movement. Its victory has had notable results but not quite the wonders which its supporters promised.
Political effort is mostly like the country described by the Red Queen in Alice Through the Looking-Glass. "Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else you must run at least twice as fast as that!" The hope of staying in the same place or making things 258 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY tioD of Austria, the civil war in Spain, the German-Czechoslovak conflict in September and October 1938, etc." That is all this restrained man has to say to the Western democracies which betrayed his country. Their well-intentioned pacifism was the cause of their weakness and indecision. This charge which Professor BeneS makes is worth serious consideration. No' one can look back on all those years since the war and deny the indecisiveness and weakness of the foreign policies of the great Western democracies. No one can deny either, I think, that part, of their indecisiveness came from the fact that there was a strong "peace at any price" party In all those countries. This indecisiveness is not a necessary characteristic of democratic foreign policy. Britain did not behave Ii ke that before the war. The United States in 1914 never "dithered'~ as it does now. How has this change come about?
Political effort is mostly like the country described by the Red Queen in Alice Through the Looking-Glass. "Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else you must run at least twice as fast as that!" The hope of staying in the same place or making things a little better all round is not a slogan to inspire masses of men. They want more stirring promises to be moved to great deeds. And in one sense they can with no deception be encouraged to fed that more is at stake now, as it was in 1914. For there is at stake the very exi.stence of a world in which it is possible for decent people to live.
Of course in 1918 there were definite reasons for disillusion~ But Dr Benes is perfectly right in maintaining that far too much is made of them. The Treaty of Versailles does not deserve all that is now said of it. There was a great deal that was good in it and will be a lasting gain. No doubt it had defects. Its manner as distinguished from its matter was very bad. But it was bound to be imperfect in the nature of things. In practical politics there have to be compromises and makeshifts. It would have had to be a heavenly and perfect settlement not to have been attacked and regarded as a failure. Men's hopes had been raised too high. They could nut see that as no cause Could e'er for such exalted confidence Exist; so none is now for fixed despair.
People in Eogland tried to escape from this unrea.sonable disappointment by pinning their faith on the League of Nations. We had fought to free oppressed nationalities. We did free them. But oppressed nationalities don't in pra.ctice, when they are freed, live up to the idealization of them which the struggle to free them ptoduces. The Treaty of Versailles did, Dr Benes maintains, produce a much better map of Europe, though the new map was bound to be disappointing compared to the high hopes we had had. But the League of Nations was still partly an ideal and we could go on idealizing It. Its establishment was thought of as the real. accomplishment and crown of all our long efforts. We thought that by it world peace had been once for all secured: that so long as we believed in the League of Nations, we should not really have to fight for it.
The institution of the League of Nations was a great achievement. It was an instrument by which peace could have been main': tained more hopefully than by any previous international arrangement. But it was not more than an instrument, and it remained true that peace needed for its maintenance constant vigilance and wisdom and courage. DEMOCRACY TODAY 259 a little better all round is not a slogan to inspire masses of men. They want more stirring promises to be moved to great deeds. And in one sense they can with no deception be encouraged to fed that more is at stake now, as it was in 1914. For there is at stake the very exi.stence of a world in which it is possible for decent people to live.
The institution of the League of Nations was a great achievement. It was an instrument by which peace could have been main': tained more hopefully than by any previous international arrangement. But it was not more than an instrument, and it remained true that peace needed for its maintenance constant vigilance and wisdom and courage.
The United States rejected the League of Nations at once. By so doing they contributed greatly to its failure. Having rejected the League they had nothing left which they could idealize as the dearly-bought prize of their great crusade, and there was thus nothing to stop their disillusionment with all that they and the Allies had done. Cynicism, says George Meredith, is the price that has to be paid for sentimentalism. If we help oursdves in our struggles too much with myths which romanticize what we are doing, we shall pay for it afterwards by believing equally false myths which degrade what we have done. Looking back 'to the years 1914-18 I don't think the foolish sentimental things that were then said were so untrue to the facts as the foolish cynical things which it has now become the fashion to say about those years.
If our democracies could learn to think and (eel like Dr Benes, to recognize that great ideals are not achieved without long and bitter struggles, without setbacks and failures: without our gains being partially spoilt by the defects and infirmities of human nature:
and could maintain in spite 0(, or almost because of. that recognition unabated courage and resolution, then indeed the world would be safe for democracy. But we are a long way from that yet. If t he democracies are to conduct a successful organization of world order, they will have to learn to be realistic, not to rely upon myths to inspire them; to face the fact that the setting up of international order is a stupendous task, not to be easily or quickly brought about.
Can it be done? It is a hard task. The democratic peoples have got to learn to think and care about international questions, to learn new political interests. For generations neither the people of Britain nor the people of the United States have had to bother about foreign politics. This is the second part of our answer to the question why the democracies became so indecisive in their foreign policy after the war.
Nations can be moved to firm and decisive action for great callses which they have learnt to feel instinctively: their independence: certain institutions and ways of behaviour, the concern for which is by this time "in their bones." To such appeals they will respond instinctively. But these are appeals to them to defend and preserve something old and precious and familiar which is being attacked.
In this generation the democratic nations are called on to do so mething new, strange, and unaccustomed: to commit themselves 260 
In this generation the democratic nations are called on to do so mething new, strange, and unaccustomed: to commit themselves to a great experiment: to go beyond themselves and almost to do violence to their old and instinctive feelings. There is 'no evading this chaUenge. Technical inventions have now made the world one interrelated sys tem: we cannot restore our old isolation jf we wanted to. Civilization will have to have some kind of international organization or it will be torn in pieces by the un-civilization of parts of OUf new interrelated world. We mos t of us see that by our intellect by this time. But we donlt feel the necessity "in our bones." vVe may form organizations and societies galore to discuss world order and think out all manner of ingenious schemes to bring it about. But in spite of all the efforts we have been making, the necessity for world order is not real enough in our minds and in our hearts for us to rouse ourselves in its defence. World order tends, alas! to live for us in another world-a world of dreams and Utopias and castles in Spain.
Great Britain and the United States are both strong countries, which have for long felt themselves fairly secure from attack. They have been able to dream about foreign affairs and the reorganization of the world. They have therefore taken a long time to look realistically at the problem before them. The pacifism which Dr Benes criticizes is not the pacifi sm of the martyr or the Christian witness: it is unrealistic or escapist pacifism. There was and still is genuine respectable pacifism in this country . But th ere has been in the years since 1918 a growth of something very different-an unrealistic, sentimental pacifism. Its adherents talked as though a little discussion would settle all difficulties: as though a series of conferences would reconcile all conflicts: as though postcard pledges would weld individuals into an organic functioning community. We have suffered from a false pacifism completely out of touch with political realities.
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